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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
This survey provides brief digests of cases that represent a variety
of aspects of international law and trade that have appeared in the United
States Supreme Court, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit, United States Court of International Trade,
Federal District Court of the District of Columbia, Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and Superior Court of Dela-
ware. The cases are grouped in topical categories and references are
given for further research.
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I. CRIMINAL LAW
EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES IS REQUIRED BEFORE APPLYING FOR FED-
ERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION. Breard
v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1997).
Francisco Breard, a citizen of both Argentina and Paraguay, was
convicted and sentenced to death for the attempted rape and capital mur-
der of Ruth Dickie in 1992. On May 1, 1995, Breard sought state collat-
eral relief by filing for writ of habeas corpus. After that was denied,
Breard sought federal collateral relief by filing a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on August 30, 1996. This was six days after the effective
date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of
1996, which created new Chapter 153 and 154 provisions which would
be applicable to habeas proceedings against a state in capital cases; thus
the AEDPA standards were held to apply in the case. Breard contended
that his convictions and sentence should be voided because authorities
failed to notify him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact
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either the Consolute of Argentina or the Consolute of Paraguay pursuant
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 21 U.S.T. 77. Breard
failed to raise this issue in the state court proceedings. The district court
held that, because Breard had never raised this claim in the state court,
the claim was procedurally defaulted and that Breard had failed to estab-
lish cause to excuse the default.
Held: Affirmed. Judge Hamilton writing for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to
deny Breard's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court examined the
impact of the AEDPA. Also, a state prisoner must exhaust all state reme-
dies before filing for federal habeas relief. The exhaustion requirement is
not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories for the first time
in his federal habeas petition. The court relied heavily upon Murphy v.
Netherlands, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997), to conclude that Breard's con-
tention that his Vienna Convention claim showing was insufficient to
show it was unavailable. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
a reasonably diligent attorney would have discovered the applicability of
the Vienna Convention to a foreign national defendant and that in previ-
ous cases claims under the Vienna Convention had been raised. Judge
Butzner filed a concurring opinion which emphasized the importance of
the Vienna Convention. While he agreed that the Convention was not vi-
olated in the case, he examined and explained the role and importance of
the Vienna Convention and concluded that its "importance . . . cannot
be overstated." Significance: A foreign national's failure to raise his Vi-
enna Convention claim in state court brings into play the principles of
exhaustion and procedural default.
II. ADMRALTY
IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE "PRODUCT ITSELF" AND
"OTHER PROPERTY." Saratoga Shipping Company v. J.M. Martinac &
Company, 117 U.S. 1783 (1997).
In January 1986, the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga sunk when its en-
gine room caught fire and flooded. Approximately 15 years prior to the
Saratoga's sinking, J.M. Martinac & Company had built the vessel, in-
stalled its hydraulic system and sold it to a man by the name of Joseph
Madruga. After purchasing the ship, Madruga decided to add extra equip-
ment to it, and after adding various equipment to the ship, resold it to
the Saratoga Shipping Company. Then, in 1987, after the accident, Sara-
toga Fishing Company filed a tort suit in admiralty against J.M. Martinac
& Company and Marco Seattle, Inc. After a trial in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California, the district judge
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determined that the hydraulic system had a design defect and as result
awarded Saratoga Fishing damages. The damages compensated for the
loss of equipment that Madruga had added after purchasing the ship new
from J.M. Martinac & Company. Both Plaintiff and Defendant appealed
this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed, holding that the district judge
erred in determining that damages could be awarded for the added equip-
ment. The Circuit Court reasoned that when Madruga resold the ship to
Saratoga, the added equipment had become part of the defective product
itself. However, a dissenting judge argued that the "product itself" was
the original vessel when J.M. Martinac & Company first introduced it
into the "stream of commerce."
Held: Reversed. Applying the East River admiralty tort doctrine,
Justice Breyer reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and sided with the
Circuit's dissenting judge. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that when
a manufacturer puts an item into the stream of commerce by selling it to
an "Initial User," (in this case, Madruga) the item or the vessel is the
"product itself." Breyer distinguished this product from the equipment
Madruga added before he resold the ship, which the Court classifies as
"other property." Simply because Madruga resold the vessel to another
user does not alter the status of the ship as the "product itself" or the
status of the added equipment as "other property." The Court considered
the general principle of admiralty tort law that manufacturers can be held
liable for damages for foreseeable physical harm caused by its own de-
fects. A plaintiff cannot, however, recover from lost profits under general
principles of contract law. Upon such consideration and in weighing East
River Doctrine's distinction between the "product itself" and "other
property," the Court concluded that the equipment added to the vessel
after the initial sale to Madruga was not part of the product, the hydrau-
lic system, that caused the physical damage to the ship. As a result, the
Court awarded Saratoga Fishing Company damages for the physical de-
struction of the added equipment. Significance: This case turns on the
East River Court's distinction between the "product itself" and "other
property." Had the Court found the added equipment to be part of the
original product initially placed into the stream of commerce by Mar-
tinac, the Saratoga would not have recovered any damages, as general
tort law usually only allows recovery for other property.
THE PRESUMPTION THAT A MOVING VESSEL IS AT FAULT IN A COLLISION
WITH A STATIONARY OBJECT DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE OBJECT IS A
VESSEL THAT IS NOT AT ANCHOR; ALSO, A CLAIM OF DAMAGES FOR A
LOST CATCH LODGED BY A FISHING VESSEL OWNER, IS NOT SPECULATIVE
1998]
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WHERE THE LOST PROFITS ARE PROVEN WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY.
Yarmouth Sea Products Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 1997).
The owner of a fleet of fishing vessels filed suit against the char-
terer of a sailing yacht to recover damages arising from a collision at
sea. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
entered judgement for the fleet owner following a bench trial. The
defendant brought this appeal, challenging the doctrinal basis upon which
the court assessed liability. The appellant also challenged the method ap-
plied for the calculation of damages. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgement, but vacated and remanded the issue of damages.
The appellee was a Canadian wholesale fish broker who frequently
contracted his fleet to fishermen under the terms of a standard "lay share
agreement." At the predawn time of the collision, the fishing vessel,
named the "Lady Olive Marie," was drifting in stormy seas roughly 130
miles from Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. The Lady Olive Marie was equipped
with two properly operating radars, operational VHF and SSB marine ra-
dios, and fully illuminated navigation and fishing lights. Also, one person
was properly "on watch," in conformity with industry custom. The crew
was waiting for the weather to subside so that they could begin fishing.
The appellant was sailing alone in the chartered yacht, the "Co-
yote," in order to qualify for a sailing competition later in the year. The
Coyote was sailing without the benefit of an operational radar, radio, or
navigation lights. Because of the complete absence of basic safety and
emergency equipment, the lower court found the defendant completely at
fault in the accident.
The district court applied the longstanding rule of admiralty that a
moving vessel is presumed to be at fault when it collides with a station-
ary visible object.' In this situation, the appellant contended that this pre-
sumption was misapplied because the fishing vessel also was not at
anchor. Even though not under power, a ship that is adrift cannot be
characterized as "stationary." For this reason, the court held that the pre-
sumption of fault as allocated was not applicable in this circumstance.
Amazingly, no authority previously existed covering a collision with a
ship that has "stopped," but not at anchor. As a result, shifting the bur-
den of proof to the appellant was improper, according to the Court of
Appeals.
The correct statutory definition that this situation falls within is that
of a power driven vessel "underway," because the ship was not "at
anchor, or made fast to the shore, or ground."' 2 The significance of this
1. The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 15 S.Ct. 804 (1895).
2. Yarmouth Sea Products, Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 392. (4th Cir. 1997).
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determination is that such a power driven vessel underway has a duty to
avoid sailing crafts. This duty is conditioned upon the ships being visu-
ally observable. Here, the appellant's ship had no standard, operating
navigation lights which effectively rendered him "unobservable." Even
though the alternative duty is not applicable, the presumption of fault
used by the district court also was not suitable. This would constitute a
clear error requiring a reversal if the court considered the mistake preju-
dicial to the outcome of the litigation.
In this instance, the appellate court declined to overturn the decision
of the trial court, considering the error to be harmless. A close reading of
the record convinced them that the decision did not rest in any signifi-
cant way upon the erroneous application of the fault presumption. The
district court had based its decision upon the "totality of the circum-
stances" that were present. The sole proximate cause of the accident, as
determined by the court, was Scully's failure to maintain a proper look-
out immediately preceding the accident,3 and the absence of basic safety
and navigation equipment that are customarily on board vessels. Because
the court assigned fault based on "substantial evidence," the court ap-
plied the rule of admiralty requiring "a vessel that violates a rule of the
road must prove that the violation could not have contributed to the colli-
sion to avoid liability."' 4 Ultimately, the court declined to reverse the
judgement as to liability because of the undisturbed findings as to breach
of duty and causation.
As to the second issue, the appellant disputed the method applied to
measure damages from lost profits where fishing vessels and lost catches
were at issue. More specifically, the appellant's contention was that as-
sessing damages for lost catch was speculative and uncertain for proper
inclusion into any claim of damages. The appellant argued further, that
the damages assessed by the district court bore an "insufficient relation-
ship" to previous voyages made by the Lady Olive Marie.
The court opened the discussion of this issue by citing Supreme
Court authority for the proposition that "the loss of profits or the use of
a vessel pending repairs, or other detention, arising from a collision or
other maritime tort, . . . , is a proper element of damage."' 5 The as-
serted key to recovery in such cases, is the ability to prove the loss of
profits "with reasonable certainty." What constitutes "reasonable cer-
tainty" is heavily fact-based and subject to case-by-case resolution. Fur-
ther guidance provided by the court through dicta, relied on whether the
3. Id. at 393.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 395 (quoting The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897)).
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vessel has been engaged, or was capable of being engaged in profitable
commerce, and the specific magnitude of that engagement. The resolution
of this issue ultimately became one of evidentiary sufficiency.
The appellant argued that the damages were not proven with reason-
able certainty. He further contended that "detention damages" accrued
while repairs are being made to the ship, are normally measured by tak-
ing a fair average of a vessel's earnings over a number of pre-collision
voyages. In this case, the lower court apparently failed to perform an in-
depth analysis of the damages, complicated further by lack of a reasoned
explanation for its findings. The court concluded that the evidence used
for the lost catch determination in this case was based upon the catch of
a "similarly situated ship" during the time period that the damaged ves-
sel was out of action. No reference was made to any previous voyages
made by the Lady Olive Marie. Thus, the court vacated the damage por-
tion of the district court decision for further fact finding and considera-
tion of the issue.
Held: Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded. The admiralty
rule that shifts the burden of proof and presumes fault to rest with a
moving vessel in a collision with a stationary, visible object does not ap-
ply where the stationary object is adrift. Also, damages to be assessed for
lost catch of a fishing vessel are proper where the damages are proven
with reasonable certainty. Significance: The Court of Appeals added a co-
rollary to a long-standing rule of admiralty, covering situations where a
vessel is neither anchored, nor affirmatively moving under its own power.
The Court of Appeals also clarified the evidentiary burden when proving
lost profits within the fishing industry where lost catch is the damage for
recompense.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
MANUFACTURERS OF DENIM JEANS ARE NOT DENIED DUTY ALLOWANCE
FOR DENIM FABRIC COMPONENTS ASSEMBLED AND GIVEN FINISHING WASH
IN FOREIGN COUNTRY, AS LONG AS THE PROCESS IS INCIDENTAL TO ASSEM-
BLY. Levi Strauss & Company v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 75 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1997).
In this action before the United States Court of International Trade,
Plaintiff, the Levi Strauss & Company (hereinafter "Levi") disputed the
denial by the United States Customs Service (hereinafter "Customs") of
a protest seeking duty allowances on cotton denim fabric components of
U.S. origin, shipped to Guatemala for assembly and re-entered into the
U.S. Levi, believing the cotton denim components qualified for partial
duty allowances under subheading 9802.00 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"), argued that the subject mer-
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chandise neither increased in value, nor improved in condition, notwith-
standing the actual assembly or minor operations incidental to assembly.
Customs, in contrast, argued that Levi's "enzyme washing" process, bet-
ter known as "stonewashing," merited no duty allowances because this
process exceeded the general rubric of things minor or incidental to
assembly.
The sole question before the court, then, was whether Levi's finish-
ing operations were either minor or incidental to assembly and, therefore,
placed the subject merchandise within the purview of subheading
9802.00.80.
Held: 1) Enzyme wash is minor and incidental to assembly process;
2) Levi-Strauss & Company is entitled to duty allowance. The court be-
gan its discussion by noting that it reviews the question of classification
of goods de novo, in contrast to a pure factual inquiry, where Customs'
determination is entitled to a presumption of validity and subject to the
"clearly erroneous" standard.' In this instance, the parties did not dispute
the applicable tariff provision, nor the material facts. The question for ad-
judication pertained to whether the material facts satisfied the statutory
standard on classification of goods, ultimately a mixed question of law
and fact.
The relevant language of subpart (c) of subheading 9802.00.80 states
in pertinent part, whether the goods "[hiave not been advanced in value
or improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except
by operations incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubri-
cating and painting. ' 2 Both the court and the parties agreed that the first
section of subpart (c) was not at issue because the enzyme wash in-
creased the value and improved the condition of the subject merchandise.
The case hinged on whether the enzyme wash fell within the purview of
the exception of subpart (c), namely, if the enzyme wash was incidental
to the assembly process.
In conducting its analysis, the court turned to the legislative history
of HTSUS subheading 9802.00.80. It cited the four-part test espoused in
United States v. Mast Industries, Inc.,3 noting that Congress intended a
balancing test to determine whether an operation of a 'minor nature' is
incidental to the assembly process. These four factors include: 1) whether
the cost and assembly time incurred for the affected component, relative
to the assembly of the finished product, were such that the operations
1. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 957 F.Supp. 281, 284 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1997).
2. There are two other subparts to subheading 9802.00.80, albeit, they are not at is-
sue in this case.
3. 69 C.C.P.A. 47, 668 F.2d 501 (C.C.P.A., 1981).
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should be considered minor; 2) whether the operations in question were
necessary to the assembly process; 3) whether the operations were related
to assembly, such that they were logically performed during assembly;
and 4) whether the economic and practical considerations were performed
practically during assembly.4
With respect to the cost and time comparisons, the court found that
Levi used the same capital equipment for all of its washing operations.
Thus, the capital investment and the cost of the enzyme wash relative to
the denim fabric components were deemed minor and incidental to the
assembly process. The assembly time comparisons provided concurring
results. The court determined that the correct wash time per garment is
determined by dividing the time of the wash by the number of garments
washed.5 The enzyme wash, then, took .334 minutes per garment and
was incidental to the assembly process.
The court found for Customs on the issue of necessity to the assem-
bly process. It determined that in manufacturing other apparel, Levi sent
fully assembled garments to separate washing facilities. Therefore, the
enzyme-wash procedure performed in the same plant, in the court's judg-
ment, was not necessary to the assembly process. Despite finding the fin-
ishing operation not necessary to the assembly process, the court never-
theless determined that the process was logically performed during
assembly. It opined that the enzyme wash operation was logically per-
formed at the situs of the assembly process where all other assembly and
post-assembly steps were performed, and where the trained personnel
were located.6
The court again found in Levi's favor with respect to the economic
and practical considerations of the enzyme-wash process. In the court's
judgement, performing the finishing operations on site made defects more
readily discoverable after washing the garment. Further, that performing
the enzyme wash on-site in Guatemala did reduce packaging costs and
reduced the time it took to move the garments to the buyer.
In a final attempt, Customs argued that the United States' finishing
industry might be seriously injured by the transfer of finishing operations
abroad. The court noted that this argument cuts both ways because deny-
ing the duty allowance is a further incentive to U.S. companies to relo-
cate their entire operation offshore. Given the frequent migration of U.S.
companies abroad, such logic could further contribute to the demise of
the U.S. industry base, which could not have been the intent of Congress.
4. Id.
5. Levi Strauss & Company v. United States, 969 F.Supp. at 79.
6. Id. at 80.
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Finally, the court determined that the enzyme-wash was analogous
to cleaning and painting, which the statute specifically lists as being mi-
nor and incidental to the assembly process. The court, therefore, held that
the enzyme-wash was minor and incidental to the assembly process and
fell within the purview of the exception to subpart (c) of subsection
9803.00.80 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. Sig-
nificance: A product finished outside of the United States qualifies for
duty allowances provided the company can show that the finishing pro-
cess is minor and incidental to the overall assembly process.
LICENSING REQUIREMENT FOR REPRESENTING ENTITY FROM A FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN, PROMULGATED By ExECuTIvE AGENCY, DOES NOT PROSCRIBE
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION. Comet Enterprises Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane
Corporation, 128 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1997).
In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12959
prohibiting certain transactions with the government of Iran. This execu-
tive order was issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1977). In response to this order,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") issued implementing
regulations that included within the definition of the government of Iran
"any entity controlled by" the government of Iran, and required legal
counsel to obtain a license to represent persons in Iran in certain
transactions.
In 1991, Air-A-Plane Corporation, a Virginia corporation, entered
into a contract with Comet Enterprises, Ltd. ("Comet UK"), a UK cor-
poration. This contract made Comet UK Enterprises the exclusive dealer
of Air-A-Plane equipment in Iran. A dispute arose between Comet and
Air-A-Plane over sales commissions due Comet Enterprises for sales to
the airline of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Comet UK and Comet Enter-
prise, Ltd. ("Comet Iran"), an Iranian corporation under common man-
agement and control with Comet UK, commenced an action against Air-
A-Plane in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on
September 14, 1995. The district court dismissed this action because 1)
the court lacked jurisdiction over Comet Iran's claim since legal counsel
for Comet Iran failed to obtain an appropriate license, and 2) Comet
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, since sales
commissions to Comet would be a payment proscribed by the executive
order.
Held: Reversed and remanded. Judge Motz for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the licensing requirement was
not a jurisdictional issue. The court cited prior authority relating to simi-
lar regulations that held licensing requirements were not jurisdictional in
1998]
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nature. The court expressed concern that interpreting the licensing re-
quirement to limit federal court jurisdiction would raise "serious consti-
tutional concerns" because the requirement was promulgated by an exec-
utive agency. Furthermore, the court held the district court erred in
dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Since exceptions to the executive order's ban existed, the court
could not conclude that Comet was unable to prove facts supporting a
claim entitling it to relief. This case was remanded to the district court
for further proceedings. Significance: This case provides guidance in the
Fourth Circuit regarding the jurisdictional effect of licensing requirements
promulgated by executive agencies for representing entities from a for-
eign sovereign.
UNDER THE FREE TRADE ACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA,
WHEN DETERMINING IMPOSITION OF IMPORT FEES, DOES "WHOLLY" RE-
ALLY MEAN WHOLLY? Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. U.S., 986 F.Supp. 1436
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).
This case, which has been designated a "test case" under the rules
of the U.S. Court of International Trade, involved a dispute over process-
ing fees placed on imports (unwrought aluminum ingots) from Canada
allegedly in contravention of the Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") be-
tween Canada and the United States. Only after completion of the admin-
istrative process and payment of all fees imposed by the U.S. Customs
Service did the Plaintiff file suit. Plaintiff contended that the ingots
should not be subjected to the higher fees. Although an additive to the
ingots did not "wholly" originate in Canada, the amount was so minus-
cule that under the FTA, the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex would
allow the products to qualify for a reduced processing fee. Alternatively,
Plaintiff argued that even if the de minimis non curat lex doctrine was
inapplicable, the additive underwent such a substantial transformation that
the ingot should now be considered as a product "wholly" originating in
Canada.
The court first considered the language of the FTA and its related
legislation. It was clear from the language that under the FTA goods
could only escape the increased fees if they "wholly" originated in the
country of origin. The precise language was that "[gloods originate in
the territory of a party if they are wholly obtained or produced in the ter-
ritory of either party or both parties." In construing the language, the
court was guided by the principle that words are given their ordinary
meaning to ensure the FTA's purpose is fulfilled. The court found the
language clear and that there was no ambiguity which would allow the
[Vol. 22
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
ingots to escape the fees, as they were judged not "wholly" Canadian
content.
Plaintiff argued that to allow imposition of the fees would destroy
the purpose of the FTA, which was to eliminate trade barriers. The court
remained unconvinced, as no evidence was presented that the FTA nego-
tiators considered the fees violative of the agreement. Plaintiff furthered
that the Department of Commerce, previously under different agreements,
had waived fees from other countries when the incoming products were
not "wholly" of origin from that country. Although Plaintiff was able to
provide concrete examples, the court was unmoved. The court found that
the U.S. government has discretion in administering the law of imports
and that the Department of Commerce neither abused its discretion, nor
violated the law. The court also noted that the recently negotiated North
American Free Trade Agreement included a provision which specifically
allowed products which were not "wholly" from the originating country
to escape the fees.
Plaintiff also argued that there was a change in tariff classification
which would allow the ingots to escape the fees. Again the court was un-
deterred and found that there was no evidence which indicated that any
subsequent manufacturing had occurred. Further, the court would not al-
low Plaintiff to classify the ingots in contravention of the FTA. Accord-
ingly, the court refused to conclude that the tariff classification had
changed.
Plaintiff's last contention was that the enactment of the FTA did not
destroy an importer's right to have the court apply the common law sub-
stantial transformation test. Plaintiff stated that the additive was a unique
article of commerce which was substantially transformed into a new arti-
cle when it was melted and molded into the cast of unwrought ingot. The
government argued that the additive's particles never underwent a physi-
cal transformation. When applying a test to determine if there was a
transformation, the court indicated a number of different factors must be
considered, (e.g., the cost of the transformation, whether the end product
is no longer the essence of the original product, etc.). In sum, the court
found that while the additive was dispersed throughout the molten alumi-
num, it was never substantially transformed during the processing.
Held: The U.S. Court of International Trade held that the ingots
were not "wholly" from Canada and, therefore, the fees collected by the
U.S. Customs Service were in accordance with the regulations under the
FTA. Significance: A country cannot escape fees unless the import is
"wholly" obtained or produced in the importing country. The court could
have established exceptions where the import included a minuscule ele-
ment not from the importing country, or where a transformation had oc-
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curred in the manufacturing of the product. Here, however, the court re-
fused to open a crack and, instead, insisted that "wholly" means wholly.
COMPANIES MUST COMPLY WITH 19 U.S.C. §1520(c) AND MAINTAIN A
SUFFICIENT INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE TO HAVE ENTRIES RELIQui-
DATED. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, No. 92-03-00164, Slip Op. 97-
121, 1997 WL 540789 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).
In the early 1980s, the Ford Motor Company ("Ford") began opera-
tion of a car and truck plant in Louisville, Kentucky to take advantage of
operating in a Foreign Trade Subzone ("FTSZ"); operating in a FTSZ
provides manufacturers with certain advantages in their duty fees. Ford
used various imported parts, namely engines and transmissions, in these
vehicles, and by operating in the FTSZ Ford was able to minimize the
duties paid on the imported parts. The prevailing duty rates at the time
were 3.3% ad valorem for imported engines and transmissions, 2.6% for
completed cars, and 25% for completed trucks. To take advantage of the
lower 2.6% rate on completed cars, Ford had to select "Non-Privileged
Foreign" ("NPF") status on the customs forms. For NPF status Ford
would pay the duty fees due on the cars upon completion. To receive the
3.3% rate with respect to its trucks, Ford had to select "Privileged Do-
mestic" ("PD") status on its customs forms. Under PD status Ford paid
the duty fees to U.S. Customs Service ("Customs") before the engines
and transmissions entered the FTSZ. Moe Tullock was the Ford represen-
tative in charge of ensuring the custom's forms were filled out correctly
and was instructed and trained accordingly. Between December 1985 and
February 1986 Tullock made myriad errors, including not paying the duty
fees and incorrectly characterizing the parts. These entries were liqui-
dated on December 1, 1989, ultimately costing Ford more than $5 mil-
lion. Ford timely protested the liquidations. Customs asserted it timely
sent Ford sixty-six Notices of Extension of Liquidation between 1986
and 1988; Ford denied receiving these Notices of Extension of
Liquidation.
Held: Under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c), a customs officer may reliquidate
an entry to correct a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence
not amounting to an error in the construction of law. Chief Judge Carman
noted a clerical error exists when a person intends to do one thing but
does something else. A mistake of law is defined as where a person
knows the facts as they really are, but has a mistaken belief as to the le-
gal consequences of the facts and acts on that mistaken belief. Finally,
the court defined an inadvertence as an inattention, oversight, negligence,
or lack of care. The court held Ford did not commit a clerical error that
would allow it relief under the law because Tullock was required to exer-
cise his own judgment to determine which parts were to be classified.
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The court noted that no mistake of fact was committed, since Ford knew
the nature of the merchandise, namely the engines and transmissions;
rather, the mistake was one of law. In regard to the extension notices that
Ford claimed it never received, the court held that while Customs satis-
fied the presumption that the extension notices were executed and deliv-
ered, Ford did not satisfy its burden in demonstrating that it in fact did
not receive those notices.
Significance: The court based its decision on Ford's lack of a good
faith effort to maintain a sufficient internal control system. Chief Judge
Carman noted, "Ford is a sophisticated corporation which is accountable
for its errors and cannot blame the Customs Service for its failure to re-
ject the entries," and "Ford's internal record retention system falls woe-
fully short . . . ." The court was willing to allow the reliquidation of
certain entries, but the company who committed the error must satisfy
the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c) and maintain a sufficient inter-
nal control system in order to recognize a wrong entry and correct that
entry within the time permitted under the statute.
WHEN A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT REMANDS A CASE BACK TO A STATE
TRIBUNAL BECAUSE IT APPEARED TO THE COURT THAT IT LACKED FED-
ERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, A U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
LACKS JURISDICTION ON AN APPEAL FROM THAT ORDER. Severonickel v.
Gaston Reymenants, 115 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 1997).
Petitioners Gaston Reymenants, a Belgian citizen, and/or Kola Inter-
national Limited Establishment ("Kola") were to serve as brokers to
Severonickel, a Russian corporation, for the sale of 800 tons of nickel
powder that was warehoused in Baltimore. In November of 1994 Sever-
onickel filed a breach of contract claim in Maryland Circuit Court
against Reymenants and Kola (hereinafter "Reymenants") claiming that
they had failed to pay Severonickel for about $3 million worth of nickel
powder. Severonickel also wanted Reymenants to account for sales of the
powder and to return any unsold powder. Reymenants removed the case
to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland under 9
U.S.C. § 205. This statute authorizes the removal from state court to fed-
eral court of those actions which relate to arbitration agreements falling
under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.
Severonickel maintained that there was no federal jurisdiction over
the breach of contract claim and moved for a remand back to state court.
Severonickel argued that the underlying contract did not include an arbi-
tration clause and was not subject to any arbitration agreement. Reyme-
nants argued that the nickel powder contract had been incorporated by
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operation of a Protocol into a previous contract between the parties.
Reymenant claimed that this earlier contract did contain an arbitration
agreement. However, Severonickel contested the validity of both the Pro-
tocol and the previous contract. The previous contract was never intro-
duced into evidence and Severonickel did not stipulate to its existence.
Furthermore, the Protocol had never been signed by Severonickel.
After a hearing at which these issues were argued, the district court
granted Severonickel's motion to remand to state court without prejudice
because the court believed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the case. Reymenants appealed the decision to remand the case back to
state court, asserting that the court had incorrectly abstained from exer-
cising its jurisdiction to decide whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
Held: Dismissed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
began its discussion by stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447 bars appellate re-
view of district court orders which remand removed cases back to state
courts. Such orders are not reviewable as long as the district court re-
manded the case on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The court then proceeded to give two reasons as to why the district court
had properly remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The first
was that the district court's written order stated that the removal of the
action "was demonstrably improvident, and that therefore subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking in this case." Secondly, at the hearing the district
court had criticized Reymenants' jurisdictional argument, stating that it
rested on "what appears to be just the thinnest of conceivable bases,
. . . far too thin a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction." The dis-
trict court went on to declare that "federal jurisdiction, frankly, doesn't
seem close on the record as it now exists, doesn't seem close. Doesn't
seem close." This satisfied the Court of Appeals that the district court
had dismissed for lack of subject jurisdiction because Reymenants had
failed to meet his burden of establishing the existence of a valid and ap-
plicable arbitration agreement which would have supported federal juris-
diction. Significance: If a district court remands a case to a state tribunal
on the ground that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then an appeal
from that decision should be dismissed by a court of appeals for lack of
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
NORMALLY FORBIDDEN "ADULTERATED" DRUGS CAN BE EXPORTED IF
THEY MEET A STRICT FOUR FACTOR TEST. United States v. Kanasco, Ltd.,
123 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1997).
Kanasco, a drug manufacturer, appealed the decision of the district
court to grant summary judgment in favor of the government in a forfei-
ture action. In the original proceedings the government requested the
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seizure and condemnation of adulterated bulk antibiotics subject to forfei-
ture under 21 U.S.C.A. § 334(a)(1). A drug is considered "adulterated"
under 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) if "the methods used in, or the facilities
or controls used for, its manufacture, processing, packing, or holding do
not conform to or are not operated or administered in conformity with
current good manufacturing practice."
Kanasco conceded that the drugs were adulterated, but argued that
the drugs were within an export exemption to the regulation. According
to 21 U.S.C.A. § 381(e)(1), a drug that is intended for export can fall
within the export exception only if it: "(A) accords to the specifications
of the foreign purchaser, (B) is not in conflict with the laws of the coun-
try to which it is intended for export, (C) is labeled on the outside of the
shipping package that it is intended for export, and (D) is not sold or of-
fered for sale in domestic commerce." As the party seeking the benefit
of the exemption, Kanasco had the burden of pleading and proving the
applicability of the exemption. The district court found that this burden
was not satisfied and stated that although there existed a factual dispute,
it was immaterial since Kanasco could not satisfy the requirements of
§ 381(e)(1)(A) and (B). Summary judgment was granted, to which
Kanasco appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
Held: Affirmed. On appeal, Kanasco contended that § 381(e)(1) does
not require that the drugs be manufactured for a specific foreign pur-
chaser, or that they need to comply with "the laws of" a particular coun-
try. Kanasco argued that it should be enough that the company could find
a foreign purchaser and they could meet the requirements of some for-
eign nations. The court, however, found that the use of the definite arti-
cle "the" to describe the words "purchaser" and "country" to mean that
an adulterated drug must comply with both the specifications of a partic-
ular foreign purchaser and the laws of a specific foreign country. A gen-
eralized assertion that the drugs could be sold to a foreign buyer and that
the sale would be consistent with the laws of some foreign country was
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 381(e)(1). The court held that
the export exceptions should be narrowly construed, especially when a
broad interpretation would seriously damage the overriding purpose of
the law.
In the current action the court was particularly concerned that drug
manufacturers would ignore the statutory quality requirements and pro-
duce adulterated drugs for sale in the United States because the export
exemption would provide such manufacturers with an "escape hatch."
Manufacturers could produce adulterated drugs for domestic sale, secure
in the knowledge that if caught they could apply for the export exemp-
tion and satisfy its requirements by finding a foreign buyer for the drugs.
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Significance: Drug manufacturers may not produce adulterated drugs
and only then find buyers in countries that allow such drugs to be im-
ported. Rather, manufacturers who want to produce adulterated drugs for
export must first find specific buyers in countries whose laws permit
such drugs to be sold before production may begin in the United States.
DUTCH PENSION PLAN HELD NOT WrhIN THE DEFINITION OF "LABOR OR-
GANIZATTION" AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 501(c)(5) OF THE INTERNAL REVE-
NUE CODE AND, THEREFORE, WAS DENIED EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION. Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor De Gezondheid,
Geestelijke En Maatschappelijke Belangen v. United States, 129 F.3d 195
(D.D.C. 1997).
Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maat-
schappelijke Belangen ("the Fund"), a Dutch pension plan jointly con-
trolled by employers and unions and claiming to be a "labor organiza-
tion" as described in section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code,
challenged the Internal Revenue Service's denial of its application for ex-
emption status from federal income taxation.
The Fund had no principal place of business in the United States,
nor did it engage in any trade or business in the U.S. The Fund did,
however, invest in U.S. stocks and municipal funds, and in 1993 its U.S.
security custodians withheld and paid to the U.S. Treasury over $8 mil-
lion dollars in income tax. The Fund then claimed tax-exempt status as a
"labor organization" under section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue
Code and filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia for the $8 million it paid in taxes. The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment for the United States, holding that the Fund had failed to
satisfy its burden of proving an alleged tax exemption "unambiguously."
Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor De Gezonheid, Geestelijke En Maatschap-
pelijke Belangen v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 373, 374, 379 (D.D.C.
1996). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Held: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the United States, holding that the Fund
failed to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating unambiguous entitle-
ment to tax-exemption. Due to the fact that the U.S. Constitution confers
authority to lay taxes exclusively on Congress in Article I, the court
pointed out that only Congress itself may create exemptions from federal
tax laws. For this reason, the court would not infer an exemption unless
Congress had clearly provided for it. The court reviewed the Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(5), the Treasury Regulation defining labor orga-
nizations, 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a) (1997), as well as prior IRS Reve-
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nue Rulings, and found no indication that a jointly controlled pension
plan governed by foreign law is a labor organization exempt from federal
taxation.
Significance: Due to the fact that there is neither a Congressional
mandate, nor an IRS Revenue Ruling which unambiguously states that
any organization bearing some connection to a traditional labor union and
performing traditional union functions is an exempt labor organization,
the court will not infer that a foreign pension plan jointly owned by man-
agement and union is entitled to tax-exempt status.
FAA INTERIM FINAL RULE IMPOSING ANNUAL FEES ON FLIGHTS THAT
NEITHER TAKE OFF FROM NOR LAND IN THE UNITED STATES IS PROCEDUR-
ALLY VALID AND NONDISCRIMINATORY, BUT THE METHODOLOGY USED TO
ALLOCATE COSTS ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE AGENCY'S STATUTORY DIREC-
TIVE. Asiana Airlines, et.al. v. Federal Aviation Administration, 134 F.3d
393 (D.D.C. 1998).
On October 9, 1996, Section 273 of the Federal Aviation Re-authori-
zation Act was enacted. The Act directed the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration ("FAA") to establish a fee schedule and collection process to
cover "air traffic control and related services provided to aircraft other
than military and civilian aircraft of the United States government or of a
foreign government that neither take off from, nor land in, the United
States." 49 U.S.C. § 45301(a)(1). The Statute directs the FAA to "ensure
that each of the [required] fees . . . is directly related to the Adminis-
tration's costs of providing the service rendered." 49 U.S.C.
§ 45301(b)(1)(B). Also, the statute calls for a special procedure: the FAA
"shall publish in the Federal Register an initial fee schedule and associ-
ated collection process as an interim final rule, pursuant to which public
comment will be sought and a final rule issued." 49 U.S.C.
§ 45301(b)(2).
Acting according to an apparent message to take prompt regulatory
action, the FAA issued an Interim Final Rule ("LFR") with an effective
date of May 19, 1997. 62 Fed. Reg. 13496 (March 20, 1997). The IFR
provided that the FAA would receive comments from interested parties
up until July 18, 1997, at which time the FAA would develop a final
rule.
Petitioners, several foreign airlines and an association of Canadian
airlines, challenged the IFR and asked the court to vacate the Rule for
several reasons. First, they claimed that the FAA had violated both the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 553, and the consul-
tation provisions of several international aviation agreements by making
the new fee structure effective before considering their comments and ob-
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jections. Second, they contended that the IFR violated the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of international agreements by imposing fees on over-
flights which had a disparate impact on foreign airlines. Third, they
argued that the IEFR's allocation of fixed and common costs using "Ram-
sey pricing" (allocating costs based on value to the users) violated the
statutory requirement that "each of the fees . . . [be] directly related to
the Administration's costs of providing the service rendered". 49 U.S.C.
§45301(b)(1)(B).
Held: Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded. The court held
for the FAA on all claims, except the third claim. As to the violation of
accepted APA procedure, the court ruled that the Federal Aviation Re-
authorization Act plainly expressed a congressional intent to depart from
normal APA procedures and, therefore, the FAA was not required to
comply with the strict requirements of APA § 553. In addition, the court
held the FAA did not violate any international aviation agreements be-
cause there was exchange of information and time for consultation pro-
vided. Prior to the effective date of the IFR, the court noted, the FAA
held informal meetings as well as a public meeting with representatives
of foreign airlines, provided copies of materials from the docket relevant
to the IFR's development, and accepted forty comments on the Rule. As
a result, the Court concluded that the procedure employed by the FAA by
which it implemented fees for overflights was proper.
On the discrimination claim, the court held in favor of the FAA.
The court noted that flights crossing through the United States require fa-
cilities and staff to manage them, and that such flights had never borne
their share of the costs of services provided to them by the FAA. As a
result, the court concluded that it is not discriminatory to charge such a
group of users for these services for which they have never previously
been charged, regardless of whether the group is disproportionately com-
posed of foreign carriers. Finally, the court held in favor of Petitioners
on their third and final claim. The FAA, using Ramsey pricing, based the
fees to be imposed on the value to the recipient of services provided,
rather than on costs. The court held that this was a violation of the clear
mandate from Congress that the fee should be service based. As a result,
the court vacated the fee schedule in its entirety and remanded to the
FAA.
Significance: When the FAA is allocating annual fees for flights
which neither take off from, nor land in the United States, even when the
total amount recovered by the FAA would equal the FAA's total cost of
providing services, the fee methodology is in violation of Congressional
mandate as long as the fees charged a particular flight are not "directly
related" to the Agency's cost of providing "each service."
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CONFLICTS OF LAW
WHEN THE DEATH OF THE HIGH SEAS ACT APPLIES, IT IS CONTROLLING
AND LmITS LIABILITY TO CONGRESS' STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED LIMITS. In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, Philomena Dooley,
et al. v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight KE007, en route
from New York to Seoul via Anchorage, Alaska, was shot down over the
Sea of Japan by a Soviet fighter plane. The Soviets claimed that the
flight intruded into Soviet airspace and that the destruction of the uniden-
tified airplane was necessary and justifiable. All 269 people aboard flight
KE007 perished.
Subsequently, 137 plaintiffs brought suit against Korean Air Lines
("KAL"). In the interest of judicial economy, the joint liability phase of
the trial against KAL was held in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. A jury returned a verdict, finding that KAL had committed
"willful misconduct."' The cases were then separated and each sent to
its respective court of origin for the second phase of the proceedings, to
determine compensatory damages for each plaintiff. This case is an inter-
locutory appeal in five damage phases that have not yet gone to trial in
the District Court for the District of Columbia.
The trial court rejected the defendant airline's argument that the
Death on the High Seas Act (hereinafter "DHSA"), 46 U.S.C. §761 et
seq., restricted the amount of damages that the plaintiffs could recover to
pecuniary losses. The district court looked to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, 2 which states that plaintiffs may recover for all damages, in-
cluding "actual harm .. . experienced" as a result of the air crash.
The district court was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that
the Warsaw Convention allows damages for harm, leaving the details to
the applicable domestic law.' The district court complied with the Court's
Zicherman guidance, and engaged in a choice-of-law analysis, concluding
that U.S. law applied in the damage suits. Further, the court held that the
DHSA provisions were applicable and, as a result, the plaintiffs could not
recover non-pecuniary damages.
The plaintiffs argued on interlocutory appeal that though the DHSA
itself recognizes no right to recover non-pecuniary damages, such as a
1. Despite a jury's finding of "willful misconduct," the Court of Appeals vacated a
punitive damages award.
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, arL 17, 49 Stat. 3000, 3018.
3. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
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decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, principles of "general maritime
law" allow recovery on this theory. The plaintiffs also offered South Ko-
rean law, which permits recovery for pre-death damages and compensa-
tion for the mental grief of surviving relatives, to inform the trial court's
decision on damage calculations, despite the court's determination that
U.S. law applies.
The Court of Appeals held that the DHSA is clear in its terms that
recovery is limited to pecuniary loss, and that pain and suffering are non-
pecuniary. The court characterized the DHSA as a true "wrongful death
statute," operating in favor of surviving relatives, rather than the dece-
dent. However, the plaintiffs contended that the DHSA acts in concert
with "general maritime law" principles which allow recovery for pre-
death pain and suffering, pointing to Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), which stated that general maritime law pro-
vided a wrongful death remedy caused by a violation of federal maritime
regulations. However, the court noted that if a death occurs on the high
seas, the DHSA controls. 4 Applying Mobil Oil, the court then stated that
there is no general maritime law survival action in cases in which the
DHSA also applies. The court noted that DHSA controlled because Con-
gress "affirmatively and specifically" acted to limit survivors to recovery
of pecuniary damages. The court's holding affords significant deference
to Congress' determinations in the area of maritime law. The court noted
that the Supreme Court in Mobil Oil it "unthinkable that a legislatively-
mandated class of beneficiaries could be judicially altered" beyond the
statutorily prescribed class of plaintiffs, or that a court could extend a
remedy beyond the pecuniary damages prescribed by Congress.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiff's contentions that
South Korean law could augment the DHSA,5 noting that if this were so,
plaintiffs could pick and choose among the most favorable of South Ko-
rean and U.S. provisions to fashion their legal theory. Further, the court
noted that the plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's post-Zicherman
ruling that U.S. law controlled. The court reasoned that because South
Korean law did not apply, then it could not grant a right of action, as
§ 764 states. Only U.S. law was available to the plaintiffs.
Held: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that the Death on the
High Seas Act limits recovery to pecuniary loss, and that pain and suffer-
ing are non-pecuniary. Additionally, § 764 of the Death on the High Seas
4. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
5. Section 764 of the DHSA states in part: "Whenever a right of action is granted
by the law of any foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in
admiralty in the courts of the United States . .
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Act does not require the abandonment of normal choice-of-law princi-
ples, allowing them to combine the most favorable elements of U.S. law
and other nations' laws. Once a court determines that U.S. law applies,
the inquiry is at an end. Significance: The Court of Appeals' holding es-
tablishes that when the Death on the High Seas Act applies, it is control-
ling and limits liability to Congress' prescribed limits. The court also re-
affirmed a basic choice-of-law principle in an admiralty setting, stating
that once a court makes a choice of law determination, it is binding. In
sum, U.S. law may not be augmented by foreign law under the Death on
the High Seas Act.
STATE OF DELAWARE IS FORUM NON CONVENIENS FOR A WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTION AGAINST A DELAWARE CORPORATION WHERE THE TORT
OCCURRED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY. In re: Nash v. McDonald's Corpora-
tion, Slip Op. 96C-09-045-WTQ, 1997 WL 528036 (Del. Super. 1997).
On September 9, 1994, young Joanna Nash died of E coli bacteria
poisoning. It was alleged by her parents, Nora and Stephen Nash, both
citizens of the United Kingdom, that the E coli virus was contracted as a
result of food items purchased at a McDonald's restaurant in Barcelona,
Spain. On September 6, 1996, the Nashs' brought suit in Delaware court
against McDonald's Corporation, McDonald's Restaurant Operations,
Inc., and McDonald's Sistemas de Espana, Inc. ("McDonald's"), all Del-
aware corporations. They sought damages for their daughter's pain and
suffering prior to death, as well as for their own mental anguish and pe-
cuniary loss as a result of their daughter's death. After the filing of suit,
McDonald's moved to dismiss the complaint based on the principle of fo-
rum non conveniens. McDonald's claimed that either the United King-
dom or Spain would provide a more appropriate forum for the claim
against them. One reason that suit was filed in Delaware was that the
statute of limitations had already run in Spain, although it was still run-
ning in the United Kingdom. McDonald's, however, had already agreed
to waive any jurisdictional or statute of limitations defenses in either of
those foreign nations if suit were to be filed there.
Held: Applying relevant Delaware law, the court granted the motion
to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The court employed six fac-
tors to determine whether Delaware was the appropriate forum to hear
the claim: 1) whether Delaware law applies; 2) the relative ease of access
of proof; 3) the availability of compulsory process for witnesses; 4) the
possibility of viewing the premises; 5) the pendency or non-pendency of
a similar action or actions in another jurisdiction; and 6) all other practi-
cal considerations which would make the trial easy, expeditious, and in-
expensive. The court first dismissed the Plaintiff's contention that Dela-
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ware was the appropriate forum due to an issue of institutional control of
parent corporations over their subsidiaries. The court concluded that this
was a simple wrongful death action. The crux of the court's argument fo-
cused on the second and sixth factors. Finding that all relevant evidence
was situated in Spain, the court concluded that the ease of proof miti-
gated against Delaware as the proper forum. As to the sixth factor, the
court doubted its ability to properly interpret Spanish law, if in fact that
turned out to be the appropriate body of law. This conclusion was due to
the civil law history of Spain, as opposed to the common law history of
the United States, as well as the language barrier that using Spanish law
would present. Another practical consideration which mitigated against
Delaware as the appropriate forum was the fact that both Spain and the
United Kingdom had a greater interest in the outcome of the case than
Delaware did. Significance: In the long run, this case will most likely
have little impact on the Delaware corporation. Of great significance was
the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court had previously expressed dis-
approval of the use of Delaware incorporation as a decisive factor in de-
ciding forum non conveniens motions. Thus, this decision did not open
doors that were not already wide open with respect to the prospect of
haling a Delaware corporation into courtrooms around the world. This
case, if nothing else, mitigates against using Delaware incorporation as a
shield against jurisdiction in foreign countries in the future.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA FINDS BALANCING TEST INAPPROPRIATE
IN CHILD CUSTODY MATTER WHEN THE FORUM STATE DOES NOT FIRST
POSSESS JURISDICTION. Dincer v. Dincer, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
701 A.2d 210 (1997).
Meltem Dincer (mother) is an American citizen of Turkish Descent
who was born and raised in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Fehmi
Dincer (father) is a Turkish citizen who met Meltem while a student in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The two parties married in 1982 in Turkey
and settled in Belgium where the father worked. They have three chil-
dren, all born in Belgium attending Belgian schools. Every year the chil-
dren visited the maternal grandparents for a month in Pennsylvania and
their paternal grandparents in Turkey for a month.
On December 8, 1994, the mother and the children traveled to Penn-
sylvania with round-trip tickets to return to Belgium on December 29,
1994. However, on December 23, 1994, the mother filed a Complaint for
Custody and Petition for Special Relief in the Pennsylvania trial court.
The court entered an Order the same day granting physical custody on a
temporary basis without prejudice. The complaint was served on the fa-
ther on January 16, 1995. A hearing was scheduled for March 6, 1995.
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On February 1, 1995, the father filed for divorce and custody in
Belgium. The mother received notice of the custody hearing scheduled in
Belgium for February 22 and 23, 1995, but she did not appear. Following
the proceeding, the court granted provisional custody to the father and he
registered the Order with Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
The trial court in Montgomery County held a hearing on March 6,
1995. The court determined that Belgium, not Pennsylvania, had jurisdic-
tion in the matter pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA").1 Accordingly, it vacated the ex parte Temporary Custody
Order, noting that the Belgian court's order must be given comity. The
mother appealed the trial court's determination, while retaining custody,
and the father also appealed the supersedeas grant to the mother of cus-
tody during the appeal. On September 5, 1995, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the grant of custody during the appeal, but vacated
the Order as to jurisdiction and remanded to the trial court for additional
findings of fact.
Pending the appeal, the Belgian Court held a hearing in which both
parties and their counsels attended. The court issued an order on October
17, 1995, affirming its jurisdiction in the matter and awarding custody to
the father. The mother did not appeal the Order of the Belgian Court, but
remained in Pennsylvania with the children.
Held: In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
Pennsylvania did not have jurisdiction to make a child custody determi-
nation, reversing in part the findings of the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the UCCJA applied
to international custody matters. In addition, the court upheld the trial
court's findings that Pennsylvania was not the children's "home state" as
defined in the UCCJA. Dismissing suggestions that the father had a "di-
minishing interest" in Belgium and acknowledging that the three week
stay in Pennsylvania prior to the filing of the instant case did not confer
jurisdiction on Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of
the trial court.
Importantly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the Su-
perior Court had no basis for engaging in a balancing test of the child's
interests with regard to Pennsylvania's exercise of jurisdiction over the
children in this matter. Significance: The children had extensive contacts
with Belgium and only after the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania found
that it had jurisdiction would it then be possible for the State to measure
its claim against another forum also having jurisdiction.
1. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5341-5366.
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FOREIGN JUDGMENTS CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
STATE WILL NOT BE RECOGNIZED OR ENFORCED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF
COMITY. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561 (1997).
On February 13, 1984, the London Daily Telegraph published a let-
ter written by Vladimir Telnikoff, criticizing certain recruitment policies
of the British Broadcasting Corporation. In response, Vladimir Ma-
tusevitch, a Maryland resident, submitted a letter that was published on
February 18, 1984, in the London Daily Telegraph that was highly criti-
cal of Telnikoff. As a result, Telnikoff filed a defamation action in Great
Britain's High Court of Justice. The Court granted Matusevitch's motion
for judgement as a matter of law. However, on appeal, the House of
Lords reversed in part, reasoning that the jury should examine the letter
written by Matusevitch by itself and not in the context of Telnikoff's ar-
ticle. On remand the jury returned a 240,000 pound verdict in favor of
Telnikoff.
Telnikoff attempted to have the judgement enforced in the United
States. On January 27, 1995, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia entered judgement in favor of Matusevitch, finding that
the cause of action underlying the English libel judgement was "repug-
nant to the public policy of the State of Maryland." On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit certi-
fied the following question to the Maryland Court of Appeals: "Would
recognition of Telnikoff's foreign judgement be repugnant to the public
policy of Maryland?"
Held: The Court of Appeals explained that the recognition of for-
eign judgements is governed by principles of comity. Nevertheless, courts
will deny recognition and enforcement of those foreign judgements which
are inconsistent with the public policies of the forum state. In this case,
the Court of Appeals answered the certified question in the affirmative
on the grounds that the principles governing defamation laws under En-
glish law, as applied to this suit, are contrary to Maryland defamation
law and the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that American and
Maryland history reflect a public policy in favor of a much broader and
more protective freedom of the press than ever provided for under En-
glish law. In fact, the court stated the contrast between English standards
governing defamation actions and the present Maryland standard is strik-
ing. In making this determination, the Court went through a detailed
analysis of the history and development of defamation laws in England
and Maryland. In doing so, the Court of Appeals found that Maryland
and English laws were substantially different for a number of reasons.
First, since Telnikoff was a pubic figure, he would have to prove by
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clear and convincing evidence that Matusevitch acted with actual malice
in publishing his letter. However, under the standard in England,
Telnikoff was allowed to recover, even though no evidence supported a
finding of actual malice. Moreover, in Maryland, Telnikoff would have
been required to prove Matusevitch's letter contained a false statement of
fact, while in England, falsity is presumed. Finally, the English courts re-
quired Matusevitch's letter to be read in isolation. In contrast, the Court
of Appeals found that its prior decisions and the decisions by the United
States Supreme Court would require that Telnikoff's original letter be
taken into account. Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public concern precluded Mary-
land's recognition of the judgement from the English courts. Significance:
Maryland courts will scrutinize the historical application and policy rea-
sons behind foreign causes of actions before recognizing a foreign judge-
ment under the principle of comity.
THE FEDERAL COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION WHERE A
CLAIMANT SEEKS ONLY RETROSPECTIVE RELIEF FOR AN ALLEGED VIOLA-
TION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY BY A STATE OFFICIAL, BUT DOES NOT
CLAIM A CONTINUING VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. The Republic of Par-
aguay v. George Allen, Governor of Virginia, et al., 134 F.3d 622 (4th
Cir. 1998).
The appellant moved for consideration from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from a dismissal of their suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. That court acted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal.
This is another case orignating from the 1993 conviction of Angel
Breard for capital murder and attempted rape in the Commonwealth of
Virginia. See survey of Beard v Pruit. Despite being a citizen of Para-
guay, Virginia authorities did not notify Breard of his right to contact the
Paraguayan consulate at any time during his detention and subsequent
trial. This omission was contrary to rights guaranteed by international
agreement through Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.' Breard received the death penalty, and with the aid of two
court appointed attorneys, exhausted all appeals available to him. 2 At no
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
2. This includes an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, where certiorari was
denied. See 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
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point during this process did Breard ever raise the issue of treaty viola-
tions incurred during his detention or trial. With the benefit of a new
counsel, he then expended his state habeas corpus proceedings without
alleging the violation of any treaty obligations. This issue was then raised
for the first time in a failed federal habeas corpus petition. At this point,
the appellant initiated this action on Breard's behalf.
The appellant was seeking relief in the form of a declaration that a
treaty had been violated, the vacating of Breard's murder conviction and
imposed sentence, and an injunction against further treaty violations. The
Commonwealth of Virginia asserted that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue, subject matter jurisdiction, and that the merits of the case made the
desired relief inappropriate. The district court determined that subject
matter jurisdiction was absent because the claimants were not alleging an
"ongoing violation of federal law." Therefore, their cause of action did
not fall within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. As
that court pointed out, the types of relief sought in this action were
overtly prospective in nature, but in reality the net effect was the retro-
spective reversal of a past criminal conviction.
The Court of Appeals began by illuminating the framework princi-
ples that comprise the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution imposes a "constitutional limitation on
the federal judicial power over certain actions against unconsenting states
of the Union." 3 This immunity has been judicially construed to apply to
actions by a state's own citizens and to foreign states. It extends not only
to actions against States as named parties, but also state officials under
color of office, where the litigation is in fact against the state as the real
party in interest.
When sovereign immunity is invoked by a state official, it is subject
to an exception where federal courts may exercise jurisdiction subject to
two conditions: 1) the subject of the litigation must be an ongoing viola-
tion of federal law; and 2) the remedy must only be prospective in effect.
The essence of these principles is that the precise moment the litigation
is commenced is determinative. The violation of federal law or an ac-
crued right arising from an international treaty must be currently active.
Then, to complete the prerequisites for remedial action by a federal
court, the petition must seek only prospective or forward-looking
remedies.
3. The Republic of Paraguay v. George Allen, Governor of Virginia, 1134 F.3d 622
(4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984)).
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The Court of Appeals then compared this doctrinal underpinning to
the facts of the present case. The violation for which the appellant sought
a remedy was the past treaty violation where Breard was not informed of
his right to contact a representative of the Paraguayan embassy. This
transgression occurred at a point in the past and was not ongoing in na-
ture. Additionally, although the relief sought was injunctive and declara-
tive and semantically prospective, the real effect to be obtained was the
voiding of a past conviction and death sentence. This would clearly con-
stitute a remedy that was distinctively retrospective in effect.
Held: Affirmed. The district court affirmed, dismissing the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint did not allege
an ongoing violation of federal law where prospective relief could be at-
tained. Significance: The basic doctrine of sovereign immunity, as judi-
cially enunciated, is upheld within the Fourth Circuit, and is extended to
cover violations of international treaty obligations by state officials.
UNAMENDED VERSION OF UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (OFAC) RULE DOES NOT PRODUCE A
"RIGHT" TO DETERMINATION OF LICENSE APPLICATION UNDER THE RULE
AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION. Bergerco Canada, A Di-
vision of Conagra, Ltd. v. United States Treasury Department, Office of
Foreign Assets Control, 129 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Bergerco Canada ("Bergerco"), a Canadian corporation, together
with its U.S. affiliate Bergerco U.S., contracted with an Iraqi State com-
pany for the sale and delivery of two large pea and bean shipments.
Bergerco received as payment a $4 million letter of credit from an Iraqi
banking institution, Rasheed Bank. Rasheed Bank named the Royal Bank
of Canada as intermediary for the payment and designated the Bank of
New York as the reimbursing bank. This essentially meant that for any
payment made from the Royal Bank of Canada to Bergerco on Rasheed's
behalf, the Royal Bank of Canada would look towards the Rasheed
Bank's account at the Bank of New York for reimbursement. However,
Rasheed Bank never asked the Bank of New York to be a "confirming
bank." Had the Bank of New York accepted the role of "confirming
bank" it would have had to exchange its credit for the credit of Rasheed
Bank, and to assume the obligation to pay Bergerco or the Royal Bank.
Bergerco made both shipments and was paid for the first but before
the second payment, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the U.S. President froze all
Iraqi property interests in the United States under authority form the In-
ternational Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06
(1997). Rasheed Bank's funds on deposit in the Bank of New York were
included in the frozen assets. President Bush then issued an executive or-
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der commanding the Department of the Treasury to distribute regulations
governing the frozen assets and providing for their release to appropriate
applicants. The Department of the Treasury then delegated the responsi-
bility to the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC").
Bergerco, on August 21, 1990, applied for a license to collect pay-
ment on a debt from Iraqi assets which were frozen. OFAC was the li-
censing agency to which Bergerco applied. Under the set of rules at the
time of Bergerco application, it was almost assured of securing a license.
However, OFAC changed the rules subsequent to Bergerco's application
and under the new rules, it stood no chance of securing the license. On
November 20, 1990, OFAC denied Bergerco's application under the new
rules. Bergerco sued OFAC seeking a declaration of its entitlement to a
license. Bergerco argued to the D.C. Circuit court that OFAC's applica-
tion of the new set of rules to its pending application constitutes retroac-
tive rulemaking and is therefore invalid under Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
Held: The court stated that was it's task to determine in what form
the articulated in Bowen applied. The court stated that practically all
changes in legal rule apply both prospectively and retroactively and that
any legal system permitting change must stand for some degree of retro-
activity. The court asserted that the Supreme Court in Bowen did not give
a precise definition of what kind of retroactivity would require explicit
authorization. The Supreme Court said not much more than
"[lretroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208. The
D.C. Circuit Court went on to hold that nothing in the previous licensing
rules gave Bergerco Bowen-protected rights. This was true because the
new rules merely shifted the "locus of the risk" of non-payment from
one party to another, unlike Bowen which dealt with a cost no one would
have incurred without the rule change. Significance:This case stands for
the premise that the OFAC and other rule-making authorities can change
rules retroactively as long as the new rule does not conjure up new costs,
but just shifts the "locus of the risk" around from one party to another.
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